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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err in denying Defendant-Appellant Salt Lake City 
Corporation's ("the City's") motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction where Plaintiff-Appellee Daniel Suazo ("Suazo") failed to 
strictly comply with the notice of claim requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30d-401(3)(b)(ii)(A) and (G)? 
This issue was preserved before the trial court by virtue of the City's 
Motion to Dismiss (Rec. pp. 40-44), challenging the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction over Suazo's allegations against the City. The issue of a court's 
subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time (Housing Auth. v. 
Snyder, 2002 UT 28, If 11, 44 P.3d 724), and challenges to subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be waived (Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^ 34, 100 P.3d 
1177). 
"Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction presents a 
question of law [,] which we review 'under a correction of error standard, 
giving no particular deference to the trial court's determination.'" Case v. 
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Case, 2004 UT App 423, f 5, 103 P.3d 171 (quoting Barton v. Barton, 2001 
UTAppl99,TJ7,29P.3dl3). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(3)(b)(ii)(A) and (G): 
(3)(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(ii) directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the 
requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to the office of: 
(A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is against an 
incorporated city or town; . . . 
. . . or 
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to 
receive the notice of claim by the governmental entity 
under Subsection (5)(e). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(5)(a), (b) and (e): 
(5)(a) Each governmental entity subject to suit under this chapter shall 
file a statement with the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code within the Department of Commerce containing: 
(i) the name and address of the governmental entity; 
(ii) the office or agent designated to receive a notice of claim; 
and 
(iii) the address at which it is to be directed and delivered. 
(b) Each governmental entity shall update its statement as necessary 
to ensure that the information is accurate. . . . 
(e) A governmental entity may, in its statement, identify an agent 
authorized by the entity to accept notices of claim on its behalf. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(6): 
(6) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall: 
(a) maintain an index of the statements required by this section 
arranged both alphabetically by entity and by county of 
operation; and 
(b) make the indices available to the public both electronically 
and via hard copy. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(7): 
A governmental entity may not challenge the validity of a notice of 
claim on the grounds that it was not directed and delivered to the 
proper office or agent if the error is caused by the governmental 
entity's failure to file or update the statement required by Subsection 
(5). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Suazo filed a Complaint in Third District Court alleging that the 
negligence of the City, Salt Lake County and/or the State of Utah caused 
him to suffer personal injuries on or about July 24, 2004. Amended 
Complaint, Rec. pp. 7-10. Suazo served the City with a Summons and 
Amended Complaint on March 22, 2006. Id. Suazo's Amended Complaint 
alleges general compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-101 et seq., and 
specific compliance with the notice of claim provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30d-403. Id at *{ 6. 
The City moved to dismiss Suazo's Complaint on April 11, 2006, 
alleging failure to comply with the notice of claim provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30d-403, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Motion to 
Dismiss and Memorandum in Support ("City Motion and Memo "), Rec. pp. 
40-44. Suazo opposed the City's Motion on April 24, 2006. Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant Salt Lake City Corp. 's Motion to Dismiss and 
Affidavit of Randall Lee Marshall in Opposition to Salt Lake City's Motion 
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to Dismiss ("Suazo Opposing Memo" and "Marshall Affidavit"), Rec. pp. 
45-58. The City filed a Reply Memorandum supporting its motion on May 
12, 2006 ("City Reply Memo"). Rec. pp. 64-76. 
The trial court heard oral arguments on the City's Motion to Dismiss 
on August 14, 2006, and filed a Minute Entry decision denying the City's 
motion the next day. Minute Entry, Rec. pp. 86-88. The City petitioned for, 
and received, permission to appeal from the trial court's interlocutory order 
denying its Motion to Dismiss. This appeal is before the Utah Court of 
Appeals on transfer from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Citations to the paginated record on appeal are 
italicized and appear as (iRec. pp. " 
1. Suazo served the Salt Lake City Recorder with a Summons and 
Amended Complaint on March 22, 2006. Amended Complaint, Rec. pp. 7-
10. 
2. Suazo alleges he was injured on or about July 24, 2004 while 
walking on a trail near "Suicide Rock" in an area "between 1-215 and 1-80 
and just west of the mouth of Parley's Canyon." Id. at ^ 8-15. 
3. Suazo alleges his injuries were due, at least in part, to the City's 
negligence. Id. at\\16-22. 
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4. Suazo alleges he complied with the requirements of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act ("Immunity Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-
101, et seq., including the notice of claim requirements of § 63-30d-403. Id. 
at\6. 
5. Contrary to this assertion, Suazo did not file any notice of claim 
with the City Recorder (Kendrick Cowley), as required by the Immunity 
Act's notice of claim requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-
401 (3)(b)(ii)(A) and (G). Suazo Opposing Memo and Marshall Affidavit, 
Rec. pp. 45-58 
6. Based on his failure to comply with the notice of claim 
requirements of the Immunity Act, the City moved to dismiss Suazo's 
Complaint on April 11, 2006. City Motion and Memo, Rec. pp. 40-44. 
7. In his opposing memorandum, Suazo claims he served the 
City's Risk Manager, Jeff Rowley, with a notice of claim that was mailed by 
certified mail on November 20, 2004. Suazo Opposing Memo and Marshall 
Aff, Rec. pp. 45-58. 
8. At some unspecified point in time prior to mailing the notice of 
claim, plaintiffs counsel claims he checked the Utah Department of 
Commerce Division of Corporations and Commercial Code's ("DCCC") 
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website to ascertain whom to serve the notice of claim on behalf of Salt 
Lake City Corporation. Marshall Aff, \4. 
9. On that unspecified date, counsel claims that the Governmental 
Immunity Database (maintained by the DCCC) indicated that Jeff Rowley 
was the authorized representative (referred to herein as "designated agent") 
to receive notices of claim on behalf of the City. Id. 
10. Contrary to these claims, on November 20, 2004, the 
Governmental Immunity Database ("Database") in fact listed the City's 
Recorder, Kendrick Cowley, as the designated agent to receive notices of 
claim on behalf of the City. Affidavit ofKathy Berg, ^ 6-7, attached to City 
Reply Memo, Rec. pp. 68-76. 
11. Kathy Berg, the Director of the DCCC, has reviewed the 
computer records of the Database and determined that Jeff Rowley was 
listed as the designated agent from June 28, 2004 to November 17, 2004. Id. 
at Iffi 5-6. 
12. On November 17, 2004, the City's current Risk Manager, 
Timothy Rodriguez, discovered the mistake and asked in writing that the 
DCCC correct it immediately. Id. 
13. The DCCC's records indicate that the City's information in the 
Database was updated the same day as Tim Rodriguez's request was 
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received. In other words, on November 17, 2004, the DCCC Database 
indicated that Ken Cowley was the City's designated agent for service of 
notices of claim on the City. Id. at \ 6. 
14. Oral argument on the City's Motion to Dismiss was heard by 
Judge Frederick on August 14, 2006. Minute Entry, Rec. pp. 86-88. 
15. Judge Frederick took the matter under advisement, and filed a 
Minute Entry denying the City's motion to dismiss on August 15, 2006. Id. 
16. In denying the city's motion, Judge Frederick found that Jeff 
Rowley was "listed in error [on the DCCC website] and this error was 
corrected shortly after its discovery," but because of "the limited scope of 
time within which the aforementioned events took place, the Court finds that 
reasonable application of the statute demonstrates Plaintiffs compliance 
with" the Immunity Act requirements. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because Suazo failed to strictly comply with the notice of claim 
requirements of the Immunity Act, the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over Suazo's claims against the City, and should have granted 
the City's Motion to Dismiss. 
It is well settled law in Utah that persons seeking to make claims 
against a governmental entity must strictly comply with the notice of claim 
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requirements of the Immunity Act. Such compliance is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite, and failure to do so divests the court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Here, Suazo had two options for service of his notice of claim: he 
could have served the City Recorder pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-
401(3)(b)(ii)(A), or the City's designated agent pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30d-401(3)(b)(ii)(G). He chose the latter. On November 20, 2006, 
Suazo served his notice of claim by certified mail directed to the City's Risk 
Manager, Jeff Rowley. However, on November 20, 2006, the City's 
designated agent was City Recorder Ken Cowley, not Jeff Rowley. 
On November 17, 2006, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-
401(5)(b), the City notified the DCCC of an error on its internet Database. 
The City asked the DCCC to correct the error immediately by removing Jeff 
Rowley, and replace him with Ken Cowley as the City's designated agent. 
The DCCC's internet Database was updated to show Ken Cowley as the 
City's designated agent that same day, three days prior to the service date 
of Suazo's notice of claim. 
Just as the City has a duty to ensure that its information on the 
Database is correct, and update that information as necessary, claimants also 
have a duty to ensure that they are relying on the most up-to-date 
information. Claimants who choose to serve a designated agent pursuant to 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(3)(b)(ii)(G) are on notice that the information 
on the DCCC's Database is subject to amendment at any time. Therefore, 
claimants seeking to strictly comply with the Immunity Act's notice of claim 
requirements must ensure that, on the actual date of service of the notice of 
claim, the entity's designated agent identified on the DCCC Database is the 
same as the agent to whom the notice is directed and delivered. Failure to 
do so results in defective service of the notice of claim, and a failure to 
strictly comply with the Immunity Act's requirements. 
Here, it is undisputed that Suazo directed and delivered his notice of 
claim to Jeff Rowley on November 20, 2006. It is further undisputed that on 
that date, the provisions of the Immunity Act and the information contained 
on the DCCC Database were clear, readily available and easily accessible to 
Suazo and his counsel. Given Utah's long history of requiring strict 
compliance with the notice of claim requirements of the Immunity Act, and 
Suazo's failure to strictly comply with those requirements, this Court should 
REVERSE the trial court's denial of the City's Motion to Dismiss. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION OVER SUAZO'S ALLEGATIONS 
AGAINST THE CITY, AND SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE 
CITY'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
A. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly mandated strict compliance 
with the notice of claim requirements of the Immunity Act. Compliance 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite, and failure to do so divests the court of 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
The trial court erred in refusing to dismiss Suazo's Complaint. It is 
well settled law in Utah that any person seeking to bring claims against a 
governmental entity must strictly comply with the notice of claims 
requirements of the Immunity Act. Failure to do so divests the trial court of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Jg. Frederick's ruling that Suazo reasonably 
complied with the Immunity Act's requirements is inconsistent with the 
Utah Supreme Court's consistent requirement of strict compliance. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("the Immunity Act") governs 
the procedure for suing the City and/or its employees. The Immunity Act 
requires the filing of a notice of claim as a prerequisite to suit. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30d-401(2). The notice must be submitted within one year after 
the claim arises, and must be filed with the City Recorder. Id. at § 
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63-30d-401(3)(b)(ii)(A) and § 63-30d-402. The City has 60 days to approve 
or deny the claim. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-403(l)(a). A claim is deemed 
to have been denied if at the end of the 60 day period the City has not 
approved or denied the claim. Id. at § 63-30d-403(l)(b). If the claim is 
denied, the claimant has one year from the date of denial to institute an 
action against the City in district court. Id. at § 63-30d-403(2)(b). 
Effective July 1, 2004, the Utah Legislature added language to the 
notice of claim provisions requiring that governmental entities subject to suit 
under the Immunity Act "shall file a statement with the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code [hereinafter referred to as "DCCC"] 
within the Utah Department of Commerce" identifying the office or agent 
designated to receive a notice of claim. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(5)(a). 
This agent will be referred to hereinafter as the "designated agent." 
While claimants were still able to comply with the Immunity Act's 
notice of claim requirements by serving their notice of claim on the City 
Recorder, the additional 2004 provisions gave claimants a second 
alternative: service of the notice of claim upon the "agent authorized by a 
governmental entity to receive the notice of claim by the governmental 
entity under Subsection (5)(e)." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(3)(b)(ii)(G). 
Subsection (5)(e) requires the DCCC to maintain a database of designated 
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agents to receive the notice of claim on behalf of the governmental entity. 
This database is maintained on the DCCC's website, and is accessible to the 
public via the internet. 
Subsection 5(b) requires that "[e]ach governmental entity shall update 
its statement as necessary to ensure that the information is accurate." By 
imposing this requirement, the Utah Legislature recognized that a 
governmental entity's designated agent may change over the course of time, 
and thus provided those entities with a means to update the information 
maintained on the DCCC's website as needed. If a governmental entity 
finds it necessary to designate a different agent for service of a notice of 
claim, and wishes to enforce compliance with the Immunity Act's notice of 
claim requirements, the entity is under a continuing duty to update its 
statement with the DCCC. Here, the City fulfilled this obligation on 
November 17, 2004, when it provided accurate information to the DCCC 
regarding its designated agent, Ken Cowley. The DCCC updated its website 
to show Ken Cowley as the City's designated agent that same day, three 
days prior to the service date of Suazo's notice of claim. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "'[w]here the government 
grants statutory rights of action against itself, any conditions placed on those 
rights must be followed precisely.'" Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, f 
12 
11,40 P.3d 632, quoting Hall v. State Dept. of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ^ 23, 24 
P.3d 958. Accordingly, the Court has repeatedly mandated strict 
compliance with the requirements of the Immunity Act. See, e.g., Wheeler, 
2002 UT 16, Tj 13, 40 P.3d 632 ("the notice of claim provision, particularly, 
neither contemplates nor allows for anything less"); Greene v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 37 P.3d 1156, 1159 (Utah 2001); Houghton v. Department of 
Health, 2005 UT 63, ^  20, 125 P.3d 860 (strict compliance with notice 
requirements of Immunity Act is necessary to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction); Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 25, ^  5, 69 P.3d 1287 
(same). Failure to comply with the Immunity Act's requirements mandates 
that the district court dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Id. 
I-
Suazo failed to strictly comply with the notice of claim requirements of 
the Immunity Act. Therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over Suazo's claims, and his Complaint 
should be dismissed. 
As discussed supra, claimants wishing to file a written notice of claim 
with a governmental entity have two options: service upon the City Recorder 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401 (3)(b)(ii)(A), or service upon a 
designated agent pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(3)(b)(ii)(G). 
Irrespective of which option they choose, claimants must strictly comply 
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with the Immunity Act's notice of claim requirements. Here, Suazo failed to 
do so. 
By logical implication, the duty imposed on governmental entities to 
update their statements also imposes a duty on claimants who choose to 
serve a designated agent to ensure that they are relying on the most up-to-
date information. The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(5)(b), 
requiring governmental entities to update the information posted by the 
DCCC, places claimants on actual notice that the information on the 
DCCC's database is subject to amendment at any time. Therefore, claimants 
seeking to strictly comply with the Immunity Act's notice of claim 
requirements for serving a designated agent must ensure that, on the actual 
date of service, the entity's designated agent identified by the DCCC 
Database is the same as the agent to whom the notice is directed and 
delivered. 
To hold otherwise would render meaningless our strict compliance 
standard, and punish governmental entities who comply with the Immunity 
Act by updating their information with the DCCC. In other words, if Utah 
courts permit claimants such as Suazo to misdirect their notice of claim 
because they allegedly relied on outdated information on the DCCC 
Database, there will be no bright line test for strict compliance with the 
14 
Immunity Act's notice of claim requirements as they apply to designated 
agents. This would constitute an abandonment of the strict compliance 
standard, replacing it with a "reasonable compliance" standard, based on 
some "reasonable" period of time during which claimants are excused from 
serving the proper designated agent. This latter approach has been 
repeatedly rejected by Utah courts. Furthermore, governmental entities 
would be in the precarious position of being statutorily required to update 
their information at the risk of waiving their right to strict compliance with 
the notice of claim requirements for some indeterminate period of time after 
the update was completed. 
This is, in effect, how the trial court ruled below. In its Minute Entry, 
the trial court concluded that Suazo reasonably complied with the notice 
provisions of the Immunity Act. That conclusion stands in direct conflict 
with Utah courts' long-standing rejection of "substantial compliance" 
arguments. The Greene and Wheeler Courts specifically rejected substantial 
compliance arguments that were identical to the argument raised by Suazo 
here (successfully) before the trial court. This Court should reverse the trial 
court's erroneous ratification of Suazo's substantial compliance argument. 
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In this case, Suazo's cause of action arose on July 24, 2004. Pursuant 
to the Immunity Act, he must have filed a notice of claim by July 24, 2005. 
For the purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that Suazo directed his 
notice of claim to the City's Risk Manager, Jeff Rowley, by certified mail on 
November 20, 2004. 
It is further undisputed that on November 20, 2004, the DCCC's 
Governmental Immunity Database listed Salt Lake City Recorder Ken 
Cowley as the City's designated agent to receive notices of claim, not Jeff 
Rowley. See Affidavit ofKathy Berg, Rec. pp. 68-76. Ken Cowley had been 
listed in the DCCC Database as the City's designated agent since November 
17, 2004, three days prior to the date Suazo misdirected his notice of claim. 
Id. Suazo's counsel testified by sworn affidavit that "[pjrior to mailing the 
notice of claim," he accessed the DCCC's Governmental Immunity 
Database, at which time he determined that the designated agent was Jeff 
Rowley. He did not state how long prior to the mailing date this occurred, 
he did not testify that he confirmed this information on the day he mailed the 
notice of claim to Jeff Rowley, nor did he state that he was in any way 
prevented from confirming the correct designated agent on the date the 
notice of claim was mailed. 
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Here, the City fulfilled its obligation to update its information on 
November 17, 2004, when it designated Ken Cowley as its authorized agent. 
Three days later, when Suazo's notice of claim was mailed, the DCCC 
Database clearly identified Ken Cowley as the City's designated agent, not 
Jeff Rowley. 
In Greene, our Supreme Court declined to reverse the trial court's 
dismissal of plaintiff s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
concluding that "[w]here . . . the statute is clear, readily available, and easily 
accessible by counsel, there is no reason to require anything less than strict 
compliance." Greene, 2001 UT 109 at 113. Just as in Greene, the facts at 
hand demonstrate that the current Immunity Act and the DCCC Database 
were clear, readily available, and easily accessible to counsel on November 
20, 2004. Given this Court's consistent requirement of strict compliance 
with the notice of claim provisions of the Immunity Act, and Suazo's failure 
to strictly comply with those requirements, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's denial of the City's Motion to Dismiss. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(7) does not apply. 
Suazo may argue, as he did before the trial court, that the City is 
estopped from challenging the validity of his notice of claim by virtue of 
17 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(7). This provision, however, does not apply 
to the facts of this case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(7) prevents a governmental entity 
from challenging athe validity of a notice of claim on the grounds that it was 
not directed and delivered to the proper office or agent if the error is caused 
by the governmental entity's failure to file or update the statement required 
by Subsection (5)." Suazo may argue that the City caused the error in 
designation of the proper agent, thus causing him to misdirect his notice of 
claim to Jeff Rowley rather than Ken Cowley. Even if argument this were 
true, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(7) provides him with no relief. 
The City is only estopped from challenging the validity of Suazo's 
notice of claim if the alleged error is "caused by the [City's] failure to file 
or update" its statement to the DCCC. There is no dispute that the City did 
in fact file the required statement, and updated its statement on November 
17, 2006. Suazo cannot demonstrate any such failure on the part of the City, 
and therefore can claim no benefit from this provision. 
CONCLUSION 
By improperly filing his notice of claim with the City's Risk Manager, 
Jeff Rowley, instead of the City's lawfully designated agent, City Recorder 
Kendrick Cowley, Suazo failed to strictly comply with the notice of claim 
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provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The notice of claim 
provisions are jurisdictional prerequisites to filing suit. Suazo's failure to 
direct and deliver his notice of claim to the City's designated agent, Ken 
Cowley, divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear his 
claims against the City. The trial court erred in denying the City's Motion to 
Dismiss, mistakenly applying a substantial compliance standard in direct 
conflict with the Utah Supreme Court's long-standing requirement of strict 
compliance. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant-Appellant Salt Lake City 
Corporation respectfully requests that this Court REVERSE the district 
court's denial of the City's Motion to Dismiss, and REMAND this case to 
the district court with instructions to DISMISS Plaintiff-Appellee Suazo's 
Complaint against the City with prejudice for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Dated this _ day of December, 2006. 
^j^^MJA^very, 
J. WESLEY ROBINSON 
Senior Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
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Valerie M. Wilde 
Deputy District Attorneys 
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Litigation Division 
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°PwyciSriT 
DANIEL SUAZO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, SLAT LAKE 
COUNTY, and SALT LAKE CITY, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 050922293 
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
August 14, 2 006 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion to Dismiss. The 
Court heard oral argument with respect to the motion on August 
14, 2006. Following the hearing, the matter was taken under 
advisement. 
The Court having considered the motion and memoranda and for 
the good cause shown, finds the motion is not well taken. 
Indeed, although the applicable statute provides that "[t]he 
notice of claim shall be: directed. . . to the office of: the 
city or town clerk. . -,"1 the same statute also requires the 
governmental entity to file a statement with the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code designating the office or agent 
to be served a notice of claim. Utah Code Ann. §63-30d-
401(5)(a)(ii). The statute further states: "A governmental 
HJtah Code Ann. §63-30d-401(3)(b)(ii)(A). 
entity may not challenge the validity of a notice of claim on the 
grounds that it was not directed and delivered to the proper 
office or agent if the error is caused by the governmental 
entity's failure to file or update the statement required by 
Subsection (5)." Utah Code Ann. §63-30d-401(7). 
In the instant, Plaintiff's counsel searched the Utah 
Department of Commerce Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code's website and ascertained that Jeff Rowley, Risk Manager for 
Salt Lake City, was the person who should be served. While Mr. 
Rowley was listed in error and this error was corrected shortly 
after its discovery, given the limited scope of time within which 
the aforementioned events took place, the Court finds that 
reasonable application of the statute demonstrates Plaintiff's 
compliance with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act requirements. 
Accordingly, Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion to 
Dismiss is, respectfully, denied. 
This Minute Entry constitutes the Order regarding the 
matters addressed herein. No further order is required. 
DATED this JV ^ day of August, 2 006. 
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